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1. Introduction 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs hereon), directly employ more than 40 
million people worldwide, or 1.3% of the global working force, and account 
for more than US$ 200 billion in global exports (FIAS, 2008; ILO, 2013). 
According to FIAS (2008), SEZs are primarily designed to attract foreign 
direct investments, to create jobs and to support wider economic strategies. 
Empirical findings on SEZs’ achievements on these objectives have been 
mixed1. Expropriation and land-grab incidents relating to the establishment 
of SEZs have in the meantime attracted much attention in the developing 
world (Sarkar, 2007; Mahalingam and Vyas, 2011). 
The rapid increase in the establishment of SEZs in India has increased 
policy debates; on the trade-off between mass welfare from industrialisation 
and the welfare of those who are ‘evicted’. Recent land-grab incidents for the 
establishment of SEZs have been marred with resistance often 
transgressing into violent riots with casualties (Sarkar, 2007). We attempt 
to seek if ‘evicted’ (or forcibly displaced) households indeed are worse-off in 
the long-run by the establishment of SEZs, thus enduring sufferance for the 
greater good of the nation. 
A handful of studies have attempted to address similar research 
questions, but they are focused on the short term and in some instances (for 
example Gatak et al. 2013) on an ex post facto basis on failed SEZs. Ghatak 
                                                          
1 See Farole and Akinci (2011) and Kim (2013) for a more recent summary of the debate. 
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et al. (2013) find that land acquisition resulted in ‘substantial’ economic 
hardship for those affected in the Singur debacle for the setup of TATA 
factory. Shah (2013) concludes that the SEZ related displacements have 
adversely affected the livelihood of certain sections of the affected villages, 
especially those marginalized in the rural communities. Shah further 
highlights that the income distribution is further widened in the aftermath 
of the setup of the SEZ. Ghatak and Mookherjee (2011) and Ghatak and 
Ghosh (2011) propose providing a compensation higher than market rates to 
potential households that are to be evicted, to deter resistance and to ensure 
their welfare. 
One issue that has sparsely featured in studies that focus on SEZs in 
India is the promise of livelihoods to affected households. Kanbur (2003) and 
Cernea (2003) assert that cash compensation is not self-fulfilling and 
propose additional non-cash based incentives for evicted households. In fact, 
the right to fair compensation and transparency in land acquisition, 
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act 2013 enacted by the Government of 
India since the start of this year explicitly addresses livelihood based safety 
nets as an added compensation measure. In addition to our focus on 
measurable indicators of welfare as a stock (static) measure, we also focus 
on livelihood effects of displacement as a process (dynamic) measure to 
identify more inclusively how displaced households are affected in the long 
run. 
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We use the case of Falta Special Economic Zone (FSEZ hereon) in West 
Bengal, India to identify the effects of displacement on welfare. FSEZ was 
setup in 1984, and was the first of such SEZs in the state of West Bengal – 
once the epicentre of British India. We chose the FSEZ for three reasons: It 
is based in West Bengal – the state home to much of the recent violent 
rioting against establishment of SEZ; it is a successful SEZ, and therefore 
we differ from studies that focus on failed SEZs; given three decades since 
establishment, we are able to identify long-term effects. 
We summarize the main findings here. Descriptive evidence suggests 
that an overwhelming majority of displaced households have not yet been 
fully compensated – three decades since displacement. There is also 
evidence of a skewed compensation policy in favour of small land owners; a 
1% increase in the amount of land lost, translated to a 2.5 percentage point 
lower share of the land being compensated. Evidence also indicates that 
evicted households are less likely to own residential plots now, and are also 
significantly less likely to have deeds for such, compared to non-displaced 
households. This deprivation of property rights for displaced households is 
likely to adversely affect them across other welfare factors, especially 
through lower access to capital.2 There is also evidence of a lower labour 
market participation rate and lower returns to education among affected 
household members.  
                                                          
2 See Banerjee and Duflo (2011) for a discussion on how this transpires. 
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Over time however, the welfare status of displaced households seems to 
converge to that of the unaffected households. In particular, we find 
evidence to suggest that members from displaced households were 8 per 
cent more likely to be employed in FSEZ compared to unaffected households 
– which possibly helped displaced households, overcome some of the 
transitional difficulties in shifting occupations. We also find that SEZs 
increase female participation in the labour market (in line with Milberg and 
Amengual, 2008; Tejani, 2011) – especially for displaced households. There 
is also some evidence to suggest that historical differences in the welfare 
level of households prior to displacement may have been homogenised by 
availing access to facilities and infrastructure more homogenously, and 
through spill-over effects since the establishment of FSEZ. 
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we provide a brief 
history of the FSEZ. Section 3 describes the design of the study and the data. 
Section 4 outlines how compensation was provided in reality. We discuss 
empirical findings on the effect of displacement on welfare effects in section 
5, and on livelihood effects in Section 6. Section 7 provides our concluding 
remarks. 
 
2. The establishment of the Falta Special Economic Zone (FSEZ). 
In 1984, the Government of India approved an area of 253 acres on the 
bank of the river Hooghly in Diamond Harbour for the setup of a Special 
Economic Zone. The site lies in ‘Falta’, 60km off Kolkata (the state capital) 
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connected by the Diamond Harbour national highway. Initially labelled as a 
‘customs area’ in 1985, the first exports from the zone have been recorded as 
being in 1986, when 14 companies were in operation at the zone (Shalti 
Research Group, 2008). At present there are 72 companies registered as 
being operational in the zone, however of them, only 52 companies are 
reported to be fully functioning. At the time of the initiation of the SEZ, a 5-
year tax-free loan was provided to companies that were to setup in FSEZ. 
After the lapse of the 5-years, many companies either re-registered under 
different names or left the SEZ, reducing the number of companies from 
over a 150 to its current level of 72. 
 
2.1. LIFE PRIOR TO FSEZ 
Villagers in the region, prior to the setup of FSEZ engaged in two main 
occupations: agricultural farming, fishing and boating – a locally coined 
term that refers to the ferrying of goods across the river on boats. Villagers 
with access to the river ‘hoogly’ (the body of water identified to the extreme 
left in Figure 1) predominantly engaged in either boating or fishing, 
although boating was not a source of constant income. Villagers further 
away from the river engaged in farming, in their own farm or others farm. 
Those who were less endowed engaged in work in the informal sector, often 
as carpentry assistants on daily wage in the state capital – Calcutta.  
Qualitative evidence from our Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with 
villagers indicate that most villagers who did not own farms, had difficulties 
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in coping with their life – often surviving on one to two meals. There is also 
evidence to indicate that literacy levels were extremely low at the time, and 
gender gaps were wide in reference to both education and labour force 
participation (see Paul and Sarma, 2013). Evidence from our FGDs and 
Shalti Research Group (2008) also indicate that at the time of land 
acquisition and prior to that, owning land titles was not common among 
households. This however, has not hampered the land entitlements for 
villagers as the practice is wide spread across the rural areas in the country 
and state legislature conducts a census of land ownership prior to land 
acquisition. 
 
2.2. ACQUISITION OF LAND IN 1984. 
The land for the FSEZ was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 
1894. The colonial era act gave absolute power to the state for forcible 
acquisition of land for ‘development’ purposes and to promote ‘national 
interests’. The Government’s Notification No. S.O 782 (E) dated 25th 
October, 1984 declared that land was to be acquired for the FSEZ. The land 
acquired was rich in alluvial soil and was very fertile; and most people who 
were affected and living in nearby villages at the time engaged in farming.  
According to a study by the Shalti Research Group, prior consultation 
with villagers was not enacted by the authorities in charge of setting up the 
SEZ. Findings from the Shalti Research Group (2008), Aggarwal (2012), and 
evidence from our FGDs with affected villagers reveals that the notification 
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read that the villagers should evacuate ‘within 30 days’, and failing such, 
‘forcible acquisition’ would be carried out. 
A committee was thus set up to look after the compensation and 
rehabilitation packages. The committee consisted of a number of people of 
from the locality and also the then District Magistrate, and a member of the 
Akalmegh Gram Panchayat. The Committee promised five things: 
(a) A job per family  
(b) Housing with basic amenities  
(c) Free electricity to all households  
(d) Better standard of living for the evicted party.  
(e) Resettlement of evicted households in a model village 
 
The committee had also decided that the evicted parties would be 
resettled in a model village (presently known as Highland). Highland was 
previously a low lying agricultural land, 1-1.5km away from Gopalpur 
where most of the agricultural land owners continue to reside from pre-
FSEZ era (see discussion below and Figure 1). Soil from these agricultural 
areas was dug to raise and develop the residential plots, leaving behind two 
excavated ponds. The total number of resettled families in the 1980s was 
about 420 (Shalti Research Group, 2008). 
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3. Objectives and criteria for sampling, and data. 
 
3.1. INDENTIFICATION OF THE AFFECTED 
A significant proportion (over 60%) of the land for the development of 
the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) came from the Calcutta Port Trust (a state 
enterprise) and more than a third of the required land was acquired from 
two villages - Akalmegh and Uttar Simulberia. 80 acres of Land was also 
acquired from a third village – ‘Gopalpur’, to resettle affected villagers from 
the aforementioned two villages of Akalmegh and Uttar Simulberia. While 
most villagers from Akalmegh and Uttar Simulberia had to give up their 
residence and residential land, most villagers from Gopalpur had to give up 
their agricultural land for the settling of those affected villagers (Shalti 
Research Group, 2008; and our discussions with Panchayat officials). 
We conducted our field work in May/June 2013, and our objective was to 
have households in all three categories: (A) Displaced Households, (B) Land 
Acquired Households and (C) Unaffected Households. In some analysis non-
displaced households includes both land acquired and unaffected households. In 
Figure 1, displaced households (category A) are now resettled in the area 
identified as ‘2’ – Highland, and land acquired households (category B) are 
resident in the area identified as ‘3’ – Gopalpur. We conducted a complete census 
of these two villages.   
[Figure 1 about here] 
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3.2. SELECTION OF A CONTROL GROUP 
There are a number of villages within a 5km radius of FSEZ that fit the 
criterion of Category ‘C’. In order to ensure that access to facilities, 
infrastructure and the FSEZ itself was similar across affected and unaffected 
households, we restricted our sample to households that were within a 500m 
radius of FSEZ. This effectively narrowed down to about the northern half of 
‘Nainan’ village (identified as ‘1’ in Figure 1). Nainan shares similar 
characteristics to the affected villages in terms of infrastructure and access to 
facilities such as schools, health clinics, banks, and local administrative offices. 
The total population of the village at the time of displacement was 4,303 based 
on figures presented in Shalti Research Group (2008). The 2011 census report 
puts the figure at 5,144 across 1,136 households – we survey about 34% of these 
households, by measuring a 500m radius cut-off point from FSEZ. An imaginary 
border we drew through the village of ‘Nainan’ for our sampling purpose  is 
depicted in Figure 2.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
3.3. DATA 
Our data comprises of 1,017 households. This includes 462 households from 
the first category (those who were physically displaced), 168 from the second 
category (those whose land was acquired to settle those in the first group; but 
were not displaced), and 387 households who were unaffected. 
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Summary statistics (reported in Appendix A) show that individual and 
household characteristics to a large extent balanced across the three villages, at 
most within a 10 per cent deviation from the total population mean for each 
variable (with the exception of education attainment). Members from Gopalpur 
were older and tended to be on the extreme ends of the education attainment 
spectrum compared to those from Highland and Nainan. Households in Gopalpur 
tended to have the highest per capita adult expenditure, followed by Highland 
and closely trailed by Nainan. 
 
4. Compensation; three decades on. 
 
4.1. UNKEPT PROMISES OF COMPENSATION 
Evidence suggests that compensation was hard to come by. Findings from a 
study by the Shalti Researh Group (2008) indicate that the first batch of 10-12 
relocated households was given Rs. 1,200 (about USD 65 based on historical 
exchange rates) per household. Further anecdotes in the study indicate that the 
compensation for evicted villagers from Akalmegh and Simulberia was fixed at 
Rs. 5,700/- per bigha of land. In addition, the people of Gopalpur, who lost their 
agricultural land for the purpose of resettlement, received very low amounts of 
compensation. Compensation paid to them in some instances was as low as Rs.5/ 
(about USD 0.27 based on historical exchange rates) - per bigha (Shalti Research 
Group, 2008).  
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Until recently, 2007/8, most villagers had not received their compensation 
in full. These pay-outs in 2007/8 were politically motivated and coincided with 
parliamentary elections and the upheavals in the state, specifically incidents 
surrounding Nandigram and Singur (see Sarkar, 2007). However the pay-outs 
failed to adjust compensation payments for inflation. Displaced households, who 
lost residences, were severely under-compensated; more than 2/3rds of the 
villagers received compensations of less than Rs. 5,000 (approximately USD 100, 
based on 2008 exchange rates). Given that in the state of West Bengal the 
current minimum wage is Rs. 5000/- per month, villagers pointed out that the 
received compensation was not significantly different from their regular income, 
and therefore was fungible; and did not represent an exogenous addition to their 
wealth. To further add to the quandary, the evicted villagers do not have deeds to 
their present residential plots.  
Qualitative evidence from FGDs also reveals that due to compensation not 
forthcoming immediately, displaced and land acquired households suffered in the 
short-term; from a transition of being agricultural land owners/workers to being 
jobless. Villagers identified cutting down on food consumption, moonlighting 
(when opportunities were available), and signing up for work in the informal 
sector as remedial measures undertaken for consumption smoothing during this 
period. Some households however did identify the existence of opportunities 
within the FSEZ as a blessing – a lack of which they identified would have 
severely strained their source of income. 
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4.2. THE CURRENT STATUS OF COMPENSATION RECEIPTS 
[Table 1 about here] 
The descriptive statistics from Table 1 indicate that, post 2008, a lion share 
of the households had received compensation for 80% of their land, both 
residential and agricultural. Locally weighted polynomial regressions show that 
land compensation for displaced households depicted a bimodal distribution (not 
reported here for brevity). In contrast for households who lost land for relocation, 
median households on the scale of amount of land lost, received the lowest 
compensation rate. This illustrates some heterogeneity in the receipt of 
compensation. 
[Table 2 about here] 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates of land size on share of 
compensation received indicate a skewed compensation policy favouring small 
land holders: a 1% increase in the amount of land lost translates to a 2.5 
percentage point lower share of the land being compensated. This is corroborated 
by findings from our Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and Shalti Research 
Group (2008). Displaced households who also possessed cultivable land were 
affected worse; they received 67% lower cash compensation compared to land 
acquired households (refer Table 2). 
[Table 3 about here] 
We find share of compensation received inversely affects current land 
holdings (Table 3); but, this is because large land owners, received lower shares 
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of compensation, and were at the same time now more likely to hold land. 
Results from Table 3 also indicate that a 1% increase in the share of 
compensation received translates to a 27 percentage point higher probability of 
having the deed for the owned residential plot and an increase in the size of 
residential land owned by about 1.4 kattas. 
 
4.3. SKEWED COMPENSATION POLICY 
As highlighted above, we find evidence of heterogeneity in compensation 
receipts based on the size of land lost – the wealthier agrarian households tend 
to have been significantly disadvantaged due to the eviction. FGDs indicate that 
compensation policies were skewed to elicit support for the transfer of land to the 
state, based on objectives of appeasing the majority. Poorer households formed 
the majority of those evicted and therefore this exerted pressure on the more 
affluent households to accept offers for displacement and compensation in terms 
that were not necessarily favourable towards them. 
A comparison of the total land lost (Appendix B-I) to the current land 
holdings (Appendix B-II) demonstrates a more homogenous distribution of land 
among displaced households – a product of the skewed compensation policies. 
Land loss was compensated in cash –and cash compensation entails additional 
problems of self-control on spending (see Banerjee and Duflo, 2011). If evicted 
households used their cash compensation for investment purposes, they should 
be better off now, with their investments paying-off three decades since their 
eviction. However, individuals do not always act rationally, as Banerjee and 
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Duflo (2011) point out. Therefore taking away revenue generating cultivable land 
or residential plots that can be used as collateral, and replacing them with cash, 
two and half decades since eviction in fact adversely affects those evicted 
households – especially the large land owners. To further add to their quandary, 
as we outlined before, the compensation rates were significantly low and were 
only paid two and half decades since their eviction.  
To summarise, affected households are yet to receive full compensation; and 
while about 80% of the households have received 80% of the compensation, they 
were unadjusted for inflation. There is also evidence that the compensation 
policy was skewed in favour of small land holders; however, there is some 
evidence that large land owners were more likely to hold deed for their lands.  
 
5. Displacement, compensation and welfare effects. 
 
5.1. ARE DISPLACED HOUSEHOLDS WORSE-OFF? 
Historically, land acquired households were rich agrarian households, 
and as Appendix 1 reports, had higher schooling levels compared to other 
types of households. Historically, displaced households used to be adjacent 
to unaffected households (where the current FSEZ site in Figure 1 lies) and 
therefore shared access to the river ‘hoogly’ similar to unaffected households. 
Given this historical pretence, we compare the welfare effects of displaced 
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households with those of unaffected households – we drop land acquired 
households from the analysis for clarity. 
[Table 4 about here] 
Results from Table 4 indicate that three decades since displacement, 
displaced households are not statistically very different from unaffected 
households in terms of per capita adult equivalent household, food 
expenditure, nor the share of food in the household budget. However, 
unaffected households reported a higher average mean asset index score, 
which is statistically significant at the 0.1 percent level. The latter results 
however have to interpreted with caution;, given that the asset holdings is 
an equally weighted index, and that material loss of assets was higher 
among the displaced households due to the displacement exercise. These 
however, contradict conventional knowledge, and findings from studies that 
have taken a short of medium term perspective (for example, Shah (2013)). 
We hypothesize two factors that contribute to this: employment (which we 
elaborate in the next section), and spill-over effects. 
 
5.2. SPILL-OVER EFFECTS 
Qualitative evidence from our FGDs highlights that one of the factors 
that contributed to the displaced and non-displaced households being 
similar now – three decades since the establishment was spill-over effects. 
Despite unaffected households not losing land or being forced to move, they 
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too lost their traditional livelihoods based on accounts of the villagers. Most 
men from unaffected households engaged in boating. With the advent of 
FSEZ, and new road infrastructure their traditional livelihood was 
threatened by road transport. New facilities such as a secondary school, post 
office, state bank office, the local administrative office and FSEZ were 
located within a similar short distance from all three villages. All of these 
factors made unaffected households endure a similar struggle and share a 
similar gain to the affected households – albeit retaining assets they 
managed to accumulate historically (as evident from Table 4). 
To summarise, three decades since their eviction, displaced households 
are not statistically different from unaffected households along measurable 
welfare outcomes, albeit having less durables assets. Spill-over effects, 
especially the thriving trade and commerce since the establishment of the 
SEZ, also subdued traditional livelihoods of unaffected households – thereby 
equalising the transition from the primary sector to the manufacturing 
sector, for both affected and unaffected households.  
 
6. Displacement and livelihood effects. 
 
6.1. WHO’S MORE LIKELY TO BE EMPLOYED? 
Probit estimates reported in Table 5 indicate that working age 
members from displaced households were about 4% to 5% less likely to take 
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part in the labour market compared to working age members from 
unaffected households; members from land acquired households were about 
7% to 8% less likely to participate in the labour market compared to 
unaffected households. However, introduction of additional controls at the 
household level weakens the power and size of the coefficient. There is also 
evidence of lower female labour market participation across all 
specifications. 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
6.2. FEMALE LABOUR MARKET PARTICIPATION 
In restricted samples by gender and category of household (which we 
do no report here for brevity), we constantly find that women were less 
likely to participate in the labour market – across all specifications and all 
samples. Two factors explain this: traditional gender roles prevalent across 
the developing world that discourage female labour market participation 
and second a lack of job opportunities. However this latter is in 
contradiction to what Tejani (2011) argues – that in areas with SEZs, female 
labour market participation is here. We ascertain this below. 
[Table 6 about here] 
The first three columns of Table 6 report the results for each category 
of household for all working age members while the last three columns 
report the results by the category of household for only active labour market 
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participants. The results from the table indicate that while women on 
average are less likely to participate in the labour market in general, of 
those who were already participating in the labour market, women were 
more likely to be employed within FSEZ than elsewhere – affirming findings 
in Tejani (2011). The results are significantly large in the range of 6 to 20 
per cent, and are statistically significant at the 5 and 0.1 per cent levels. 
 
6.3. EMPLOYMENT AT FSEZ 
[Table 7 about here] 
In Table 7 we assess if employment in FSEZ was forthcoming for 
villagers – a condition of compensation laid out in 1984. The outcomes in the 
first four columns of Table 7 are based on the sample of working age group 
members, whereas the probit estimations shown in the last two columns are 
based on only on the sample of active labour market participants. The 
marginal effects seem to indicate that members from displaced households 
are about 3% to 4% more likely to be employed in FSEZ compared to 
unaffected households, whilst members from land taken households were 
about 6% less likely to be employed within FSEZ. Once the household 
characteristics are controlled for, these effects become statistically 
insignificant. An interaction of gender and being displaced indicates women 
from displaced households to be about 5 per cent less likely to participate in 
FSEZ. However, restricting the sample to active labour market participants, 
we find that displaced household members were about 8% to 10% more 
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likely to be employed within FSEZ and women from displaced households 
were statistically no different in employability within FSEZ. 
 
6.4. IS EMPLOYMENT AT THE FSEZ A BLESSING? 
Conditions of employment however in general, at the FSEZ, are not 
merry – based on qualitative evidence we gathered during FGDs. An 
informal market for workers driven by middlemen – referred to as 
contractors locally, have ensured that employees at FSEZ have no formal 
contract of work and are employed on an ad-hoc basis. This also results in 
non-constant remuneration and creates difficulty in expenditure smoothing 
for households dependent on the FSEZ for income.  
The positive selection of females into work at FSEZ has also been 
credited to these contractors who under-pay women.3 Evidence from Paul 
and Sarma (2013) indicates that the gender wage gap within FSEZ was 5 to 
10 percentage points higher than the general average, disfavouring female 
employees. Despite this, our FGDs indicate that about 75% of the workforce 
within FSEZ is women. Discussions with villagers indicate that women are 
primarily employed in six factories that manufacture and export plastic 
ware at the FSEZ. Based on the account of one contractor, women are 
                                                          
3 Some descriptive statistics not reported here for brevity also indicate a widening gender pay 
gap within FSEZ.  See Paul and Sarma (2013) for a more detailed discussion of this widening 
gender disparity. 
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preferred over men because organised demands for pay and reform are 
absent among women – and they are cheaper to be hired. Discussions with 
some of the female employees indicate that their employment at FSEZ 
cannot be seen as female empowerment, because in fact their decision to 
work at FSEZ was exogenously determined by either their husband or their 
father – out of necessity rather than choice. They also credit their 
employment at FSEZ for lower years of schooling for their children – which 
they feel would not be the case, if they were at home taking care of their 
children and their husbands/fathers could find employment with FSEZ. 
Villagers also highlight the lack of training and in-migration of 
workers from outside the locality (and in some instances from outside the 
state) as hampering the likelihood of having a regular stream of income 
from work within FSEZ. There is also some qualitative evidence to suggest 
that men from displaced and non-displaced households are increasingly 
seeking work outside the locality (out-migration), especially in the informal 
sector. 
To summarise, there is some evidence to suggest that displaced 
households are generally less likely to participate in the labour market, but 
among those who do, there exists a statistically significant positive selection 
into working within the FSEZ – this is especially true for women from 
displaced households. This extension of employment at FSEZ we 
hypothesise is one of the reasons that displaced households are not 
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significantly worse-off compared to non-displaced households as evident 
from the previous section. 
 
7. Concluding remarks. 
We do not find statistically significant evidence to suggest that 
displaced households are worse-off in the long run due to the establishment 
of a SEZ. Our results indicate that displaced households did suffer from 
lower compensation, lack of property rights, lower asset holding and 
generally lower labour market participation – but they benefitted from 
employment at the SEZ. The setup of a SEZ also involves disruptions in the 
status quo of activity in the vicinity and via spill-over effects is likely to 
affect households that were not chosen to be ‘evicted’ – levelling the welfare 
effects across households that are affected and unaffected. Qualitative 
evidence from FGDs however, does indicate that displaced households 
suffered in the short-term, especially from a transition from the primary 
sector of the economy to the manufacturing sector, but in the long-run they 
are no different from unaffected households. 
We conclude from our findings that with sound policy initiatives, 
difficulties imposed on displaced households can be overcome. Two factors 
that need to be addressed: (a) affected households are guaranteed 
employment thus allowing them a smooth transition from their traditional 
livelihoods to industry based livelihoods. (b) Compensation both cash and in-
kind (including land titles) is made immediately available to those who are 
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affected. Addressing these factors would ensure that in addition to evicted 
households being not worse-off in the long-run, their short-term worries are 
also addressed. The recent legislation enacted in India with reference to 
land acquisition and resettlement is a step in the right direction in this 
regard. Successful implementation of it, within specified timelines of action, 
would ensure that affected parties, especially evicted households do not view 
the need for SEZs for national progress as a curse on them.  
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Figure 1: The villages. 
Note: 1 – Nainan, 2 – New Gopalpur (“Higland”), 3 – Gopalpur. 
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Figure 2:  Map of Nainan Village 
Note: The yellow line running across the village is the 500m radius mark from FSEZ. Houses 
to the north of this imaginary line were surveyed for our study. The grey lines indicate 
pathways. 
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Table 1: Compensation of land by category of household 
Proportion of compensation received Displaced Land Acquired Total 
0 0.00 1.24 0.70 
1-49% 4.84 3.72 4.2 
50-79% 4.03 4.35 4.21 
80% 90.32 77.64 83.16 
100% 0.81 13.04 7.72 
Source: Authors’ own calculations.   
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Table 2: Displacement and receipt of compensation 
 
Share of land 
compensated 
Log 
compensation 
rate per katta 
Log cash 
compensation for 
land 
Log cash 
compensation for 
residence 
Displaced and owned 
cultivable land  
0.137* 
(0.062) 
-0.296 
(0.187) 
-0.673* 
(0.283) 
-0.319 
(0.180) 
Displaced and did not own 
cultivable land 
-0.158** 
(0.061) 
-0.347 
(0.193) 
-1.128*** 
(0.287) 
 
 
Total land lost (natural 
logarithm) 
-0.024** 
(0.009) 
-0.015 
(0.033) 
0.787*** 
(0.045) 
0.436*** 
 (0.070) 
Disp_1984 
0.134* 
(0.056) 
-0.015 
(0.052) 
0.211 
(0.189) 
-1.262*** 
(0.227) 
Disp_1985 
0.081 
(0.058) 
-0.022 
(0.065) 
0.139 
(0.199) 
-1.193*** 
(0.233) 
Other controls     
Constant 
1.033*** 
(0.133) 
6.268*** 
(0.593) 
7.603*** 
(0.711) 
8.415*** 
(0.826) 
R2 0.084 0.064 0.749 0.345 
N  583 567 567 435 
Note:  *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Robust standard errors in parantheses. Other controls include the 
following covariates: household size, a dummy for split households, number of children, number of female and male 
working age members in the household, religion, and the following characteristics of the head of the household: 
gender (Female=1), log of age, educational attainment and marital status.  
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Table 3: Regression outcomes of Deed, Ownership and Size of Residential Plot Holdings 
 
Own Residential 
plot 
Deed for 
residential plot 
Size of residential 
plot 
Share of compensation 
received 
-0.215* 
(0.084) 
0.272* 
(0.112) 
1.383* 
(0.694) 
Displaced and owned 
cultivable land  
-0.485*** 
(0.101) 
-0.250* 
(0.099) 
-3.718*** 
(1.057) 
Displaced and did not own 
cultivable land 
-0.505*** 
(0.107) 
-0.171 
(0.094) 
-3.371** 
(1.104) 
Total land lost (natural 
logarithm) 
-0.009 
(0.014) 
0.033 
(0.018) 
0.074 
(0.167) 
Disp_1984 
-0.082 
(0.077) 
-0.067 
(0.091) 
-0.667 
(0.462) 
Disp_1985 
-0.075 
(0.082) 
-0.221* 
(0.096) 
-0.534 
(0.417) 
Other controls    
Constant 
0.812*** 
(0.223) 
1.038** 
(0.348) 
0.219 
(2.556) 
R2 0.798 0.259 0.258 
N  444 583 424 
Note:  *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Robust standard errors in parantheses. Other controls include the 
following covariates: household size, a dummy for split households, number of children, number of female and male 
working age members in the household, religion, and the following characteristics of the head of the household: 
gender (Female=1), log of age, educational attainment and marital status.  
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Table 4: Welfare outcomes across displaced and unaffected households 
  
Unaffected 
Displaced 
households 
t-statistic 
Per capita adult equivalent household expenditure 177802.70 184230.90 -1.54 
Per capita adult equivalent food expenditure 98555.22 100493.50 -1.41 
Food share of total expenditure 0.5854 0.5927 -1.74 
Household total asset holdings 3.93 3.33 10.28*** 
Note:  *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 5: Profiles of active labour market participants 
Dep Var. = Labour force participation rate (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Displaced 
-0.126* 
(-0.048) 
-0.100 
(-0.035) 
-0.106 
(-0.037) 
-0.054 
(-0.018) 
Land taken 
-0.223** 
(-0.082) 
-0.195* 
(-0.073) 
-0.178 
(-0.067) 
-0.171 
(-0.064) 
Female (Yes=1) 
-2.041*** 
(-0.661) 
-2.077*** 
(-0.673) 
-2.088*** 
(-0.675) 
-2.029*** 
(-0.661) 
Log(PCHHE)   
0.200** 
(0.078) 
0.202** 
(0.079) 
Displaced* Female   
 
 
-0.128 
(-0.048) 
Individual controls     
Household controls     
Constant -1.146*** -0.873** -2.730*** -2.767*** 
N  3,292 3,292 3,292 3,292 
Note:  *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Marginal fixed effects reported in parantheses. The sample comprises of 
the working age population, defined as those between the ages of 15 and 65 inclusive. Individual level controls 
include the following covariates: natural logarithm of the age, dummies for level of education and dummies for 
marital status. Household level controls include the following covariates: household size, dummy for split 
households, number of children, ethnicity/religion, and the number of male and female working adult members. 
PCHHE – Per capita household expenditure 
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Table 6: Profiles of FSEZ workers among active labour market participants (restricted 
model) 
Sample: Working age population Active labour market participants 
Dep Var. = Work in FSEZ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Female (Yes=1) 
-1.073*** 
(-0.185) 
-0.719*** 
(-0.059) 
-0.700*** 
 (-0.106) 
0.417* 
 (0.157) 
0.765* 
(0.209) 
0.711*** 
(0.244) 
Log(age) 
-0.186 
(-0.030) 
-0.154 
(-0.013) 
-0.338 
(-0.065) 
-0.621** 
(-0.204) 
-0.592 
(-0.111) 
-0.909*** 
(-0.282) 
Primary (Yes=1) 
0.035 
(0.005) 
-0.172 
(-0.015) 
0.133 
(0.018) 
0.179 
(0.063) 
-0.369 
(-0.073) 
0.101 
(0.020) 
Secondary (Yes-1) 
0.146 
(0.024) 
-0.272 
(-0.022) 
0.200 
(0.031) 
0.327* 
(0.114) 
-0.280 
(-0.051) 
0.359* 
(0.104) 
Higher (Yes=1) 
0.280 
(0.053) 
-0.415 
(-0.025) 
0.353 
(0.064) 
0.546* 
(0.201) 
-0.564 
(-0.080) 
0.797* 
(0.283) 
Individual controls       
Household controls       
Constant -0.240 0.793 0.175 2.228** 3.707* 2.380** 
N  1,559 545 1157 637 215 513 
Note:  *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Marginal fixed effects reported in parantheses. For columns one (1) to 
three (3), the sample comprises of the working age population, defined as those between the ages of 15 and 65 
inclusive. For columns four (4) to six (6), the sample comprises of those actively participating in the labor market; 
and the corresponding dependent variable being the percentage of active labor market participants working within 
FSEZ. These are reported for members from each category of household in the order: displaced, land taken and 
unaffected. Individual level controls includes the marital status. Household level controls include the following 
covariates: household size, dummy for split households, number of children, ethnicity/religion, and the number of 
male and female working adult members. PCHHE – Per capita household expenditure. 
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Table 7: Profiles of FSEZ workers  
Sample Working age population Active labour 
Dep Var. = Work in FSEZ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Displaced 
0.171** 
(0.028) 
0.109 
(0.018) 
0.092 
(0.015) 
0.224** 
(0.036) 
0.250** 
(0.079) 
0.314*** 
(0.099) 
Land taken 
-0.412*** 
(-0.057) 
-0.230 
(-0.033) 
-0.211 
(-0.030) 
-0.200 
(-0.029) 
-0.178 
(-0.054) 
-0.167 
(-0.051) 
Female (Yes=1) 
-0.825*** 
(-0.136) 
-0.872*** 
(-0.136) 
-0.882*** 
 (-0.137) 
-0.671*** 
 (-0.103) 
0.591*** 
(0.211) 
0.778*** 
(0.282) 
Log(PCHHE)   
0.222*** 
(0.034) 
0.222*** 
(0.034) 
  
Displaced* Female   
 
 
-0.407** 
(-0.054) 
 -0.402 
(-0.110) 
Individual controls       
Household controls       
Constant -0.847** 0.187 -1.850*** -1.916** 2.311*** 2.312*** 
N  3,292 3,292 3,292 3,292 1,377 1,377 
Note:  *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Marginal fixed effects reported in parantheses. For columns one (1) to 
four (4), the sample comprises of the working age population, defined as those between the ages of 15 and 65 
inclusive; for columns five (5) to six (6), the sample comprises of those actively participating in the labor market; 
and the corresponding dependent variable being the percentage of active labor market participants working within 
FSEZ. Individual level controls include the following covariates: natural logarithm of the age, dummies for level of 
education and dummies for marital status. Household level controls include the following covariates: household size, 
dummy for split households, number of children, ethnicity/religion, and the number of male and female working 
adult members. PCHHE – Per capita household expenditure. 
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Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics 
Village Affected and 
displaced 
Affected but not 
displaced 
Unaffected Total 
 
A: Household Level 
 
Number of households in each Village: 
    
Highland 460 1 5 466 
Gopalpur 0 107 52 159 
Nainan 2 60 330 392 
Total 462 168 387 1,017 
 
Characteristics: 
    
Household Size 4.9 4.5 4.4 4.6 
No. of Children (<13 years) 1.2 0.8 1.1 1.1 
No. of female in WAP 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.4 
No. of male in WAP 1.5 1.6 1.3 1.4 
Age of the head 43.6 50.9 44.3 45.0 
Female head (Yes=1) 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.14 
Head of the HH with no formal 
schooling (Yes=1) 
0.40 0.26 0.45 0.40 
Mean log per capita avg expenditure 11.99 11.98 11.99 11.99 
Mean log wage 11.28 11.54 11.25 11.31 
Share of food in budget spending 0.59 0.57 0.59 0.59 
Average asset holding index 3.33 4.53 3.93 3.74 
     
B: Access to facilities (time taken in minutes by foot) 
Primary school 12.71 9.69 8.52 10.79 
Secondary school 20.12 16.00 20.48 19.38 
Health centre 19.17 36.67 22.29 22.81 
Bank 20.27 15.37 16.58 17.92 
Bus stop 8.88 9.64 9.21 9.13 
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C: Individual Level 
 
Number of individuals in each Village: 
    
Highland 2,269 13 33 2,315 
Gopalpur 0 468 214 682 
Nainan 9 290 1,484 1,783 
Total 2,278 771 1,731 4,780 
 
Characteristics: 
    
Female (Yes=1) 0.49 0.45 0.48 0.48 
Age 25.4 30.3 26.1 26.4 
No schooling (Yes=1) 0.36 0.23 0.38 0.35 
Primary education (Yes=1) 0.33 0.27 0.30 0.31 
Secondary education (Yes=1) 0.26 0.38 0.28 0.28 
D: Individual Level (Age ≥ 45) 
 
Number of individuals in each Village: 
    
Highland 360 1 5 366 
Gopalpur 0 116 44 160 
Nainan 2 63 247 312 
Total 362 180 296 838 
 
Characteristics: 
    
No.of elders in household 0.94 1.19 0.88 0.97 
Female (Yes=1) 0.46 0.43 0.49 0.46 
Age 54.5 57.8 56.5 55.9 
Years of schooling 0.48 0.64 0.37 0.48 
No schooling (Yes=1) 0.51 0.38 0.63 0.52 
Primary education (Yes=1) 0.27 0.22 0.23 0.25 
Secondary education (Yes=1) 0.18 0.29 0.11 0.18 
Note: WAP – Working Age Population. INR – Indian Rupee. Source: Authors’ own calculations.  
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Appendix B-I. Total land lost (cultivable and residential) by displaced households. 
 
 
Appendix B-II. Total land held (cultivable and residential) by displaced households 
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